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I.  Introduction 
Over  the  past  few  decades  economists  have  increasingly  turned  to 
psychologically-based  explanations  of  individual  behavior.    Whether  used  to  explain 
involuntary unemployment, excessive risk taking, gender differences, firm entry and exit 
patterns,  discrimination  patterns,  or  labor  supply,  behavioral  economists  have  lent 
important insights into the underlying data patterns observed.  Interestingly, even though 
environmental  economists  provided  early  ammunition  to  the  pioneers  of  behavioral 
economics, we have been slower to adopt psychologically-based explanations throughout 
our field.
1  To provide a step in that direction, this study explores how the preference 
reversal literature can be used by environmental and resource economists. 
Beginning  with  the  work  of  Slovic  and  Lichtenstein  (1968)  evidence  has 
accumulated that theoretically equivalent measures of preference elicitation can lead to 
systematically  different  preference  orderings.    The  early  results  from  psychology 
laboratories  received  added  attention  from  economists  after  Grether  and  Plott  (1979) 
found  that  these  inconsistencies  were  robust  to  salient  incentives  and  other  controls 
consistent with best practices in experimental economics.  Their study confirmed that 
preference orderings over lotteries could be sensitive to the elicitation’s response mode, 
either choices or prices.    
More recently, another type of choice anomaly has been discovered—preference 
reversals which occur over joint and isolated evaluation modes.  In the isolated evaluation 
mode, a single good is valued on its own.  In the joint evaluation mode, two or more 
goods  are  compared.    Reversals  of  preference  across  evaluation  modes  have  been 
                                                           
1 A puzzle arose nearly three decades ago when researchers discovered that the WTP measure of value 
differed starkly from the WTA measure (see, e.g., Hammack and Brown, 1974).   4 
 
observed  both  for  hypothetical  choices  between  private  goods  and  in  market 
environments (Bazerman et al. 1999; Hsee et al. 1999; List 2002).  
The  apparent  robustness  of  evaluation  mode  reversals  raises  an  important 
practical question for environmental valuation.  This is because two prominent methods 
for eliciting stated preferences differ precisely in whether goods are evaluated jointly or 
in isolation.  Contingent valuation exercises typically ask for the valuation of an isolated 
program or good.
1  Alternatively, choice-based methods ask consumers to value a pair or 
set of programs that are presented simultaneously when constructing marginal values of 
the characteristics (Adamowicz 2000, Adamowicz et al. 1998, Louviere, Hensher, and 
Swait 2000).  
Although both methodologies are widely used, the small lot of studies that contain 
estimates using both approaches suggest that valuations can differ substantially across 
evaluation modes (Boxall et al. 1996; Frederick and Fischoff 1998; Irwin et al. 1993; 
Magat et al. 1988; Takatsuka et al. 2002).  Further, the direction of the difference is not 
uniform across studies.  For example, Irwin et al. (1993) find that public goods are more 
likely to be chosen when they are directly compared with a private good that is presented 
at the same time, while Boxall et al. (1996) report contingent valuation estimates that 
greatly exceed those from their choice experiments, a result they attribute to subjects 
ignoring the value of substitute goods in the isolated evaluation mode.  
Our experimental treatments test for evaluation mode effects using both public 
and private goods.  The private good treatment is an extension of List’s (2002) sportscard 
market study.  To provide a test of joint and isolated valuations over public goods, we 
examine willingness-to-pay for farmland preservation and water quality improvements 5 
 
with  the  questions  structured  to  parallel  the  market  treatments.    The  public  goods 
treatments  are  designed  to  identify  the  impact  of  evaluation  mode  on  the  ability  of 
respondents to interpret information, shedding light on one source of scope insensitivity 
that should be considered in the design of stated preference surveys.
2  Thus, in contrast to 
earlier studies that argue that respondents are unable to formulate economic values for the 
goods  or  are  expressing  general  attitudes  (see  for  example,  Kahneman  and  Knetsch 
(1992),  and  Desvouges  et  al.  (1993)),  we  focus  on  identifying  the  cognitive 
underpinnings  of  scope  effects,  using  both  market  and  non-market  valuations  for 
robustness.  In this way, our work complements Heberlein et al. (2005), who argue that 
“we need to better understand the conditions that produce scope failure.”   
The  remainder  of  our  study  is  structured  as  follows.    Section  II  summarizes 
briefly the related literature.  Section III describes the experimental design.  Section IV 
discusses the experimental results.  Section V discusses the import of these results, and 
Section VI concludes. 
II.  Background and Related Literature  
Bazerman et al. (1992) were the first to demonstrate the existence of preference 
reversals  over  joint  and  isolated  evaluation  modes.    They  presented  subjects  with  a 
hypothetical  dispute  between  neighbors  and  asked  them  to  evaluate  alternative 
resolutions.  In the isolated evaluation mode, equitable settlements, in terms of monetary 
payoffs, were preferred.   In the joint evaluation mode, the preference  for equity  was 
overturned in favor of settlements that maximized social welfare.   Additional studies 
have elicited the preference reversal across examples that include hiring practices, and 
the provision of public versus private  goods (see, e.g., Hsee 1996; Hsee 1998).  We 6 
 
present an example from this literature in some detail to make clear the character of the 
reversal.  
Hsee (1998) examined the valuation of goods where one of the goods, good L 
(where L represents “Less”), is a proper subset of the other, good M (“More”).   Hsee 
compared choices over two sets of dinnerware with the following characteristics: 
Set M: 40 pieces  31 in good condition, 9 are broken 
Set L:  24 pieces  all in good condition 
The two sets shared the same 24 pieces (8 dinner plates, 8 salad plates, 8 dessert plates) 
in good condition.  In addition, set M contained cups and saucers of which 7 were intact 
and 9 were broken.  Set L was priced higher in the isolated evaluation mode, between 
subjects, while set M was preferred when the two were evaluated jointly, within subjects.  
The  reversal  has  been  characterized  as  a  “more  is  less”  preference  reversal  by  Hsee 
(1998).  
List’s (2002) study, which is extended here, incorporates a problem similar in 
character to Hsee’s dinnerware example, but in a naturally occurring marketplace for 
sports  memorabilia.    Importantly,  subjects  endogenously  select  into  the  market  (and 
select their roles in the market) and rather than giving hypothetical responses, voluntarily 
used their own funds to bid in an incentive-compatible auction.  List finds that the “more 
is less” reversal is alive and well in the market setting, although attenuated among a 
group of super-experienced subjects (sportscard market dealers). 
The  underlying  causes  of  the  evaluation  mode  reversals  have  been  discussed 
primarily by psychologists.  Bazerman et al. (1999) argue that differences in valuation 
across  modes  arise  because  information  about  the  attributes  of  a  good  has  different 7 
 
salience  –  or  evaluability  –  in  the  different  modes.    In  the  “chipped  plate”  example, 
discussed above, the evaluability hypothesis suggests that the number of plates in the 
package received increased salience in the joint evaluation mode because quantities are 
easily compared in that setting.  In the isolated evaluation mode quantity has reduced 
salience, and the chips in the plates take on importance as valuation cues.  Hsee et al. 
(1999)  also  note  that  the  value  function  for  attributes  with  little  “evaluability 
information” is relatively unresponsive to changes in the attribute level, consistent with 
findings regarding insensitivity to scope.  The combination of changes in salient cues and 
scope  insensitivity  can,  in  extreme  cases,  lead  to  the  observed  evaluation  mode 
preference reversals.  
In his Nobel Prize lecture, Daniel Kahneman discusses evaluation mode reversals 
in  the  context  of  a  research  program  investigating  the  “architecture  of  cognition” 
(Kahneman  2003).    The  cognitive  model  posits  two  systems:    “System  1”  is  quick, 
associative, and intuitive while “System 2” is slower and based on rules and reasoning 
(Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Chaikin and Trope 1999).  The use of automated choice 
heuristics by System 1, such as representativeness or affect, has been shown to produce 
biases that may be mitigated by System 2’s supervision of intuitive judgments.
3   
The ability of System 2 to carry out its role may be compromised in isolated 
evaluation, however, since relevant cues, such as the quantity changes in Hsee’s (1998) 
example, are absent.  Kahneman (2003) argues that these changes are generally more 
accessible  than  absolute  values,  and  their  absence  makes  the  use  of  an  automated 
heuristic more likely.  In the case of the cracked dinnerware it seems plausible that in the 
isolated  evaluation  mode  a  System  1  response  to  the  poor  quality  items  affected  the 8 
 
willingness-to-pay for the bundle.  In joint evaluation, the information was available to 
promote System 2 responses.  Differences in behavior across experience levels, reported 
by  List  (2002),  can  also  be  understood  in  the  context  of  dual-process  theory,  which 
suggests that complex cognitive operations can migrate from System 2 to System 1 with 
repeated exposure to similar tasks (Kahneman and Frederick 2002).
    
While the literature has focused on psychological explanations, it is worthwhile to 
consider whether an economic model of quality signaling can rationalize the preference 
reversal results as well as, or along with, the cognitive theories.  List’s (2002) study 
provides some evidence on this issue since the goods were explicitly graded for quality 
by  an  independent  third  party  with  an  established  reputation  in  the  marketplace.    If 
quality signaling was sufficient to explain the pattern of results, we would expect the 
bundle of goods, in this case 13 sportscards, to be priced similarly  across evaluation 
modes,  since  identical  information  on  quality  is  available  in  both  settings.    The 
hypothesis of equal values, however, is rejected in favor of the one-sided alternative that 
the prices are greater in the joint evaluation mode.
4  This finding suggests that the cues 
regarding the low quality cards receive additional emphasis under isolated evaluation. 
This represents the starting point for our private good market treatments. 
 III.  Experimental Treatments and Hypotheses 
The experiments we conduct include both an extension of List’s (2002) study of 
private goods in the sportscard market and contingent valuation treatments over public 
goods.  The sportscard market experiment alters List’s original study by changing the 
information that the participants receive about the cards in a simple way—removing the 
cards  from  their  sealed,  graded  cardholders,  effectively  removing  the  signal  of  their 9 
 
quality.  We hypothesize that the removal of the grading information will accentuate 
valuation  differences  across  the  valuation  modes,  although  the  dual  process  theories 
suggest that sportscard dealers may be less affected by the informational change than 
nondealers  (see  also  List, 2003; 2004).  The use of ungraded sportscards in the new 
experiments also provides a conceptual bridge to the public goods treatments, since the 
quality of the public goods we present is more difficult to gauge than that of the graded 
sportscards.  
A.  Market Treatment 
The market study was conducted on the floor of a sportscard show in Orlando, 
Florida  and  closely  followed  List  (2002).    Each  participant’s  experience  typically 
followed  three  steps:  (1)  inspection  of  the  goods,  (2)  learning  the  auction  rules  and 
placing  a  bid,  and  (3)  conclusion  of  the  transaction.    Subjects  approached  the  table 
voluntarily, and if they agreed to participate were randomly allocated into one of the four 
treatments. 
In treatment LI (LI denotes less, isolated), ten 1982 Topps baseball cards were 
auctioned off.  The 10-card bundle had a book value of approximately $15.  These cards 
were the same ones that List (2002) used, except in this case the grade of the cards was 
removed so the professional grader’s opinion was not observable to the participants.
5  In 
treatment  MI  (MI  denotes  more,  isolated),  a  bundle  of  13  cards  was  auctioned:  the 
identical 10 Topps baseball cards and an additional 3 different 1982 baseball cards that 
were previously professionally graded as in “poor” condition—the worst grade possible.  
While the three additional cards are of much lower quality than the original 10 cards, they 
do  have  economic  value:  in  aggregate,  the  13-card  bundle  has  a  book  value  of 10 
 
approximately $18.  As in the LI treatment, the grades were not observable to the market 
participants. 
In  the  third  treatment,  treatment  JP  (Joint  Price),  the  same  two  bundles  were 
auctioned off side-by-side.  Accordingly, each subject submits two bids, one for each 
commodity bundle.  To provide comparable budget sets across the three treatments we 
informed subjects in treatment JP that if they were winners in both auctions, a random 
coin toss would determine which auction was binding.  Finally, to provide an explicit link 
to the extant preference reversal literature on evaluation scales, and provide insights into 
behavior over choices, a fourth treatment, treatment JC (Joint Choice), was conducted in 
which market participants simply paid $3 and chose their most preferred bundle (rather 
than bidding in an auction).  Panel A in Table 1 summarizes the 2x3 experimental design.  
Akin to List (2002), we allow both experts (dealers) and non-experts to participate in the 
experiment.     
To  gather  individual  values,  we  use  an  incentive-compatible  mechanism;  the 
random nth price auction.  As described in Shogren et al. (2001), the random nth-price 
auction can be characterized by 4 simple steps:  (1) each bidder submits a bid; (2) all bids 
are rank-ordered from lowest to highest; (3) the monitor selects a random number (n) 
uniformly distributed between 2 and Z where Z is the number of bidders; and (4) the 
monitor sells one unit of the good to each of the (n-1) highest bidders at the nth-price.  
Akin  to  Vickrey’s  (1961)  second-price  auction,  the  random  nth  price  auction  is 
theoretically incentive compatible.  Determining the number of goods available through 
the random device is useful to us, since it means that every participant is potentially in 
the market.  Thus bidders have an incentive for truthful revelation even if they believe 11 
 
they are not near the upper tail of the value distribution.
6  Since we are not testing the 
incentive compatibility of the institution, and want to avoid excess noise, we inform the 
subjects that it is in their best interest to bid their true value in the auctions.  We reinforce 
this notion via several examples that illustrate the optimal strategy of truthtelling.   
After learning the auction rules, the subject placed their bid(s) to complete Step 2.  
Finally, in Step 3 the experimenter concluded the experiment by informing the subject 
that he should return at 6PM on Sunday to find out the results of the auction.  Subjects 
were informed that if they could not return for the specified transaction time, they would 
be contacted and would receive their cards in the mail (postage paid by the experimenter) 
within three days of receipt of payment.   
B.  Public Goods Treatments 
In the public goods treatments respondents valued either wetlands restoration (W) 
or farmland preservation (F).   The experimental design parallels the market study in that 
sets of goods are valued either jointly (J) or in isolation (I).  Further, the sets of goods can 
be characterized as L or M with L   M.   As in the sportscard study, the additional 
goods in the M bundle are of lower quality than those in L.  In the farmland preservation 
treatment the L question asks for a contribution to the permanent preservation of 500 
acres at a specified price.  The good in the M question includes the 500 acres and an 
additional temporary preservation of 50 acres.  The wetlands example similarly augments 
a full cleanup with a partial cleanup of an additional area of polluted wetlands.  As in the 
sportscard treatment a ‘more is less’ interpretation of the results depends on the fact that 
the lower quality goods do in fact have positive economic value.
78     12 
 
Treatments  were  conducted  at  contribution  levels  of  $50  and  $100  for  the 
wetlands study and at the $50 level for the farmland study and are denoted as W50, 
W100, and F50.
9  In the isolated evaluation mode subjects had the hypothetical choice of 
contributing the indicated amount or refusing. In the joint evaluation mode subjects could 
choose to contribute either to the L or M goods, or not contribute (N).     
Subjects for the W50 and W100 treatments were recruited from visitors to a booth 
displayed by the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University 
of  Maryland  on  Maryland  Day  in  April  2002.    Participants  were  paid  $1  for  their 
responses  and  completed  the  protocol  in  2  to  3  minutes.    Sixty-five  percent  of  the 
Maryland Day subjects were students at the University.  In the F50 treatment, subjects 
were University of Maryland undergraduates who responded to the questionnaire before 
participating  in  an  unrelated  set  of  experiments.  Panel  B  of  Table  1  summarizes  the 
public goods experimental design.  
C.  Hypotheses 
We examine the impact of evaluation mode on bids in the market treatments and 
on contribution rates in the public good treatments.  To clarify the hypotheses and results 
we make use of the following definitions: 
Definition 1: A strong evaluation mode effect is observed when, in aggregate, preferences 
over the bundles are: LI (Less, Isolated)  MI (More, Isolated) and MJ (More, Joint)   
LJ (Less, Joint). 
Definition 2: A weak evaluation mode effect is observed when, in aggregate, preferences 
over the bundles are: LI ~ MI and MJ   LJ. 
 
A strong evaluation mode effect requires an inverse relationship between the scope of the 
good and the valuation in the isolated evaluation mode - the “more is less” reversal. A 
weak evaluation mode effect requires insensitivity to scope in the isolated evaluation 13 
 
mode.  The two definitions are identical with respect to the joint evaluation mode where 
MJ ￿ LJ.  
  In addition to testing for the existence of evaluation mode effects we examine 
subsidiary  hypotheses  on  (i)  the  impact  of  grading on  the  extent  of  evaluation  mode 
effects in the market treatments and (ii) the impact of evaluation mode on aggregate 
contributions to public goods.  The nature of the test for (i) requires examining bids from 
the joint and isolated modes simultaneously. To control for the two bids per person in the 
joint mode we estimate an error components model that is described in detail, below.  
Parameter estimates from this model also provide evidence on the tests of the primary 
hypotheses on the existence of strong and weak evaluation mode effects.  
The specific hypotheses are presented in Table 2.  The table also presents the 
linear combinations of coefficients from the regression model that is used to test the 
hypotheses in the market setting.  The model contains indicator variables for good type 
(More), evaluation mode (Joint) and their interaction, along with dealer status (Dealer) 
and the information condition (Grade), and all interactions. Each variable is coded one 
when the condition is consistent with the variable name and zero otherwise and so the 
baseline (constant only) estimate represents the bids on ungraded cards of nondealers in 
the  Less  and  Isolated  condition,  a  structure  we  exploit  in  constructing  the  tests  of 
hypotheses outlined in Table 2.
10   
  The subsidiary hypothesis (ii) for the public good treatments examines whether 
contribution rates differ between the evaluation modes by comparing the proportion of 
respondents who offer to contribute in the joint versus isolated modes.  14 
 
IV.     Experimental Results 
A.  Market Treatment 
  Table 3 summarizes the sportscard market data.  For each treatment two rows of 
data are included.  The first row contains the results from the new field experiments 
conducted with the ungraded cards.  In the row below, in italics, are the results from 
List’s 2002 study in which the identical cards were graded.  We present three results from 
the sporstcard market treatments, the first two from the new ungraded card data, and the 
third comparing the bids for the graded and ungraded sportscards.  
Result 1: Inexperienced agents exhibit a strong evaluation mode effect consistent with a 
preference reversal. For this group average bids are significantly higher for the 10 card 
L bundle than for the 13 card M bundle in the isolated evaluation mode. The relationship 
is reversed under joint evaluation. 
 
Result 2: The experienced agent subject pool is characterized by a weak evaluation mode 
effect. Bids on average are higher for the 10 card L bundle in the isolated evaluation 
mode and for the 13 card M bundle under joint evaluation. However, the differences are 
not  significant  at  conventional  levels.  Evidence  of  a  weak  effect  of  evaluation  mode 
exists, with M preferred to L in the joint evaluation mode.  
 
Result 3: Among inexperienced agents the strong evaluation mode effect is accentuated 
when the information on quality is removed. 
 
Statistical  inference  to  support  these  three  results  makes  use  of  nonparametric  and 
parametric  tests.    The  parametric  tests  include  t-tests  for  independent  and  matched 
samples, and a tobit regression model in which the bid, censored at zero, is regressed on 
treatment indicator variables and their interactions.  The model uses a random effects 
error structure and is given by: ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ if ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ and zero otherwise, with 
￿￿￿ representing bidder i’s t
th bid with t = 1 (t =1, 2) in the isolated (joint) evaluation 
mode, and￿￿￿￿ the vector of indicator variables and their interactions.  The distribution of 
the  error  components  is  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿,  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿,  and  the  vector  of 15 
 
parameters,  β,  is  estimated  with  maximum  likelihood  techniques  (Woolridge  2002).  
Results  presented  in  Table  4  include  the  magnitude  and  statistical  significance  of 
individual coefficients as well as combinations of coefficients relevant for identifying the 
existence of evaluation mode effects (Result 1 and 2), and the impact of grading on their 
extent (Result 3).  
Descriptive statistics supporting Result 1 are presented in the first panel of Table 
3. In the isolated evaluation mode the average bid for non-dealers is $4.05 for the 10-card 
bundle (LI) but only $1.82 for the 13-card bundle (MI), a difference of approximately 
121 percent.  Both a large-sample t-test and a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test indicate that 
prices across the evaluation modes differ significantly at a level of p < .01, with the LI 
bundle strongly preferred to the MI bundle.  The tobit estimation provides additional 
support for Result 1 due to the large negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
the More variable, reported in column 1 of Table 4.  
Treatment JP yields the opposite result with the M bundle valued more highly.  
The mean bid for the 10-card LJ bundle is $2.89, whereas the 13-card MJ bundle’s mean 
bid is $3.32, a difference of approximately 13 percent.  Using both a matched pairs t-test 
and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for matched pairs, we find that the null hypothesis of 
identical values is rejected at the p < .01 level.  Further, the sum of More and the More x 
Joint interaction term from the tobit model, presented as Result 1 in Table 4, is positive 
(0.548) and significant (p < 0.01).  Synthesizing the results across evaluation modes, we 
find that preferences do reverse; the L (M) bundle is valued more highly under isolated 
(joint)  evaluation.    This  is  the  ‘more  is  less’  result  found  in  List’s  initial  study  and 
elsewhere in the literature.  16 
 
Descriptive  statistics  supporting  Result  2,  for  the  market  professionals,  are 
presented in the lower panel of Table 3.  While directionally the values are in accord with 
the data gathered from non-dealers, the magnitudes of the differences are smaller.  In the 
isolated evaluation mode, the dealers average bid is $3.52 ($3.36) for the L (M) bundle, 
and the difference is not significant using any of the statistical methodologies.  In the 
joint evaluation mode, the dealers bid $3.48 ($3.21) for the M (L) bundle. The statistical 
significance of this result differs across methodologies.  A matched pairs t-test yields a 
significant difference (p< 0.01) but the tobit coefficients (Result 2b in Table 4) do not (p 
= 0.14).  Hence, by the first measure, we do find evidence of a weak evaluation mode 
effect and conclude that evaluation mode has a minor impact on the dealers’ willingness-
to-pay.   
Result  3  considers  how  the  information  on  sportscard  quality  interacts  with 
evaluation mode by examining willingness-to-pay across the graded and ungraded cards.  
We  limit  attention  to  the  nondealer  subject  pool,  where  significant  evaluation  mode 
effects are observed, and find that the preference reversal in the isolated evaluation mode 
is  accentuated  for  nondealers  when  the  information  on  card  quality  is  removed.  
Comparing the LI and MI treatments in the first panel of Table 3, the $4.05 and $1.82 
mean values for the ungraded cards represent a 122% difference in pricing.  For the 
graded cards the L good is priced 58% higher than the M good ($4.85 vs. $3.06).  The 
coefficient on the interaction term Graded x More is positive (1.71) and significant (p = 
.027) indicating that the magnitude of the preference reversal increases when the grading 
is removed.  This finding provides fresh evidence and support for the hypothesis that 
information across evaluation modes is critical in determining the strength of valuation 17 
 
anomalies.    The  result  further  heightens  the  stakes  when  considering  applications  to 
public goods, where the quality may not always be as easily observed.  
B.  Public Goods Treatments 
Hypotheses tests on the existence of evaluation mode effects and on aggregate 
contributions in the public goods treatments are reported as results 4 and 5, and are as 
follows:     
Result 4:  Contributions to public goods are characterized by a weak evaluation mode 
effect in which M is preferred to L under joint evaluation and L and M do not differ 
significantly under isolated evaluation. 
 
Result 5:  Contribution rates are higher in the joint evaluation mode  for the pooled 
wetlands treatments and in the aggregate public goods data.  
 
Table 5 summarizes the data for Result 4 which reflects a pattern of results consistent 
with a modest effect of evaluation mode.  Columns LI  and MI report results for the 
isolated evaluation mode.  In all treatments we find that the proportion contributing to the 
L  good  is  greater  than  that  contributing  to  the  M  good,  although  the  results  are  not 
statistically  significant  even  if  responses  are  pooled  across  all  treatments.    Thus  we 
observe that LI ~ MI; contributions are insensitive to the scope of the good in the isolated 
evaluation mode, a result on contribution rates similar to that observed on the bidding 
behavior for the professionals in the sportscard market.  
The columns labeled Joint Evaluation Mode in Table 5 provide some evidence 
that M is preferred to L in this setting.  Column J reports the proportions choosing the L 
and M public goods as well as those declining to contribute (N).
11  Column LM reports 
on tests of proportions between the L and M goods conditional on contribution.  For the 
farmland preservation data presented as treatment F50, there is clear evidence that MJ ￿ 
LJ.  The same is true for the pooled public goods data.   Combining these results with 18 
 
those in the isolated evaluation mode where there is no statistical difference between LI 
and  MI  contribution  rates,  yields  results  consistent  with  the  definition  of  a  weak 
evaluation mode effect.  
Finally, as noted in Result 5, we observe that contributions are higher in the joint 
evaluation mode.  Table 6 presents a summary of the data that compares contribution 
rates  in  the  joint  and  isolated  evaluation  modes,  where  a  contribution  represents  a 
willingness to contribute to either the L or M good.  We find that contribution rates are 
uniformly higher in the joint evaluation mode, ranging between 70% and 80% in contrast 
to  rates  between  55%  and  63%  under  isolated  evaluation.    These  differences  are 
statistically significant in the pooled watershed data and in the data pooled over all the 
public goods treatments (treatment WFP).  These results also indicate that the evaluation 
mode affects the valuation results.  
V.    Discussion 
The  experimental  sessions  yield  evidence  of  evaluation  mode  effects  in  the 
valuation of private goods, and weak evaluation mode effects in the valuation of public 
goods.  The extent of the effects, where we see variability, depends on both experience 
and  the  provision  of  information  that  helps  bridge  the  differences  in  information 
evaluability  across  modes.    Dual  process  theories  of  cognition  can  deepen  our 
understanding of these results, and guide stated preference design.   
The strong preference reversal observed by the nonprofessionals in the sportscard 
market  provides  the  most  dramatic  evidence  of  the  importance  of  these  cognitive 
processes.    The  inability  to  compare  goods  in  the  isolated  evaluation  mode  places 
individuals in a situation of relative uncertainty.  As a result, the observable low quality 19 
 
of a subset of the goods has a strong effect on the overall valuation, consistent with the 
idea that rapid System 1 processes are less likely to be moderated or constrained by 
System  2  cognition  in  the  isolated  evaluation  mode.    The  weak  preference  reversal 
exhibited by the market professionals provides additional evidence consistent with dual-
process theory since experience can provide an internal referent of value, mitigating the 
importance of information evaluability.  The informational treatment provides additional 
evidence consistent with the evaluability hypothesis.  The impact of mode on valuation is 
accentuated when information readily available across modes – the sportscard grades – is 
removed.  
The similarity of the public good results to those of the market professionals is 
interesting.  The  weak  evaluation  mode  effect  observed  in  the  public  good  setting 
indicates  that  the  expression  of  preferences  is  affected  by  framing,  consistent  with 
insensitivity to scope.  In analogy with the sportscard dealers, we hypothesize that those 
valuing the public goods have internal referents that mitigate Type 1 responses, perhaps 
due to the extensive publicity that these issues have received from governmental and 
nongovernmental  sources  in  the  region  which,  in  effect,  provide  respondents  with 
experience in valuing the goods.   
The source of the insensitivity to scope observed in this study differs from that 
most frequently discussed in the literature.   Rather than  arguing that  respondents are 
expressing general attitudes or are unable to formulate economic values for the goods 
(see for example, Kahneman and Knetsch (1992), and Desvouges et al. (1993)), we focus 
on identifying the cognitive underpinnings of scope effects, using both market and non-
market valuations for robustness.  Our emphasis complements recent work by Heberlein 20 
 
et  al.  (2005)  who  also  argue  that  “we  need  to  better  understand  the  conditions  that 
produce  scope  failure.”    Their  study  examines  the  impact  of  affect  and  cognition  on 
sensitivity to scope, restricting attention to the isolated evaluation mode.  They find lack 
of scope in valuations is widespread, but note that it is consistent with the respondents’ 
cognitive and affective focus on the smaller, usually local, goods.  Our study introduces 
an additional important consideration by demonstrating that the cognitive and affective 
contributions  to  valuation  can  differ  significantly  across  joint  and  isolated  valuation 
modes.  
VI.  Conclusion 
Mainstream  economists  have  begun  to  more  fully  recognize  that  a  firm 
understanding of the psychological processes of individuals is necessary to model human 
behavior  and  prescribe  efficient  public  policies.    In  the  environmental  arena,  where 
nonmarket valuation is a critical tool, the stakes are quite high, and one can learn a great 
deal  by  more  fully  understanding  psychological  concepts  and  how  they  influence 
individual choices.  Using two related but distinct experimental frameworks to compare 
value statements across joint and isolated evaluation modes, this study presents results 
directly at the intersection of the disciplines of environmental economics and psychology.   
Our findings confirm and extend previous work on the importance of differences 
in information evaluability across evaluation modes.  Perhaps most provocatively, the 
results reaffirm the importance of the “more is less” preference reversal phenomenon and 
extend it to the domain of public goods.  Overall, our data suggest that preferences are 
inconsistently expressed over the joint and isolated evaluation modes for both private and 21 
 
public goods.  The effect is accentuated when uncertainty exists about the good’s quality, 
but is reduced with the experience of the respondent. 
Needless to say, this research has raised more questions than it has answered. We 
believe, however, that researchers and policymakers who must decide which valuation 
technique to use should consider the issues raised by the cognitive processes associated 
with the joint and isolated evaluation modes. From one perspective, the joint evaluation 
mode is preferred since the monotonicity of valuations in the joint evaluation mode yields 
results consistent with the fundamental idea that “more is more.” Decisions made in the 
isolated evaluation mode, however, have a relevance that is also undeniable:  once a 
policy is implemented, after all, its impact is experienced largely in isolation.  
More  generally  we  believe  that  it  is  important  to  understand  the  nuances  and 
biases  of  our  valuation  techniques,  particularly  since  the  U.S.  federal  government 
requires that every economically significant proposal (about 50-100 per year) receive a 
formal analysis of the benefits and costs.  In this sense, our hope is that the pattern of 
results discovered herein will eventually lead to theories and behavioral generalizations 
that become part of the analyst’s tool box.   
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Welcome to Lister’s Auctions. You have the opportunity to bid in an auction for the goods on 
the table. The number of auction participants, denoted “n” below, will be determined by how 
many subjects choose to participate in the auction during this sportscard show. 
 
Auction Rules: 
You are asked to submit one bid in the auction, and there will be a total of n bids submitted, 
where n, is unknown at this time and depends on how many people agree to participate.  The 
monitor will rank all the bids from highest to lowest and the winning bidder(s) will be 
determined in a random fashion.  Here is how it works: The monitor will put all the bids in a 
bag and randomly draw out one of them.  If the monitor randomly selects the bid ranked #20 
(the 20
th highest bid), then each of the 19 bidders who bid more than this bid would win in the 
auction and receive the goods after they sent me the value of the 20
th highest bid.  There is an 





th, …or nth highest bid.  Let’s 
go through an example to be sure you understand the auction rules. 
 
In this example the number of bidders, n, is equal to 10. After receiving all the bids I will 
rank the bids from highest to lowest as follows: 
   
  $C  High bidder 
  $D  2















$Z  Low bidder 
 
I will draw from the bag one of these bids. Assume that the bid drawn randomly is the 8
th 
highest which corresponds to $K.  If this bid is drawn, the top 7 bidders win and pay the 
value of the 8
th highest bid for the cards. In this case all the players would pay $K. 
 
In this type of auction you should bid your true value for the goods (i.e. what they are worth 
to you).  If you bid too much, you increase your chance of winning, but face the risk of 
paying more than the cards are worth to you.  If you bid below your true value, then you risk 
not being among the winners when a bid of your true value might have won and you would 
have paid less than your true value for the cards.  This is true because in this type of auction 
your bid never affects the price you pay in the auction, just whether you win or lose.  In this 
example, note that since all seven winners pay the 8
th  highest price, they will all pay less than 
their true value, when that is their bid. 
 
Here are a couple of examples that demonstrate that it is best for to bid your true value. First 
consider the case where I bid more than my true value. Suppose I bid $C, and turn out to be 
the highest bidder. In this case I am guaranteed to win in the auction since the winning bid is 
drawn from those ranked 2
nd through 10
th.  Suppose now that the random draw brings up the 23 
 
3
rd highest bid, $A which is the price I must pay as an auction winner.  If my true value is less 
than $A, I have won the auction with my bid of $C but actually suffer a loss. My loss is the 
difference between the price I pay, $A, and my true value for the cards.  Similarly consider 
the case where I bid less than my true value.  Suppose that I bid $Z and am the low bidder. 
Assume this time that the random draw pulls up the 9
th highest bid $V. If my true valuation 
were greater than $V, I have missed an opportunity to buy at a price less than my true value, 
by bidding too low.  
 




At 6 PM Sunday night I will determine the winners of the auction. After the winners pay 
me  (cash or check) they will receive the goods.  Note that, regardless of the price, the goods will 
be awarded to the winners.  In case you cannot attend the “determination of winners” session at 6 





Phone # _________________________________ 
 
If you are unable to attend at 6 PM, I will contact you by phone. Upon receipt of your 
check or cash, I will send you the goods that you have won.  All postage will be paid by Lister’s 
Auctions for goods mailed to winners. 
 
Note that I guarantee to sell the goods to the winners no matter what the final auction 
price turns out to be. Your bid represents a binding commitment to buy the goods you win at the 
prices specified by the auction outcomes. 
 
 
Good Luck – please write your bids on the sheets provided. 
 
Thanks for participating. 
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Confidential Bidding and Survey Sheet 
 
 






I verify that if I am determined a winner I will be liable for paying the determined amount in 
exchange for the bundle of cards. 
 
Please complete the information below.  THIS INFORMATION WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY 
CONFIDENTIAL. 
 




2.  Are you a sportscard or sports memorabilia professional dealer? ________________ 
  
3.  Gender:   Male     Female 
 
4.  Age ___________    Date of Birth ______________ 
 
5.  What is the highest grade of education that you have completed? (circle one) 
1) Eight grade  3) 2-Year College    5) 4-year college 
2) High School  4) Other post-High school  6) Graduate school 
 
6.  What is your approximate yearly income from all sources, before taxes? 
1) Less than $10,000    5) $40,000 to $49,999 
2) $10,000 to $19,999    6) $50,000 to $74,999 
3) $20,000 to $29,999    7) $75,000 to $99,999 
4) $30,000 to $39,999    8) $100,000 or over 
 












Appendix B: Public Goods Questions 
 
1. Wetlands treatments W50 and W100. X is 50 in W50 and 100 in W100. 
 
Question L:  
Thanks for participating! 
 
A special Maryland Day 2002 environmental conservation program has been  discussed at the 
University of Maryland. This program, if funded, would entirely clean up 500 acres of wetlands 
in the Chesapeake Bay.  The clean up program would by funded by individual contributions.  
Each individual who contributes to the clean up program would receive a certificate indicating 
that they helped the effort. 
 
I would contribute $X to a program that would result in an entire clean up of 500 acres of 
wetlands: 
 
      Yes      No 
 
Question M:  
Thanks for participating! 
 
A special Maryland Day 2002 environmental conservation program has been  discussed at the 
University of Maryland. This program, if funded, would entirely clean up 500 acres of wetlands 
in the Chesapeake Bay and partially clean up 50 acres.  The clean up program would by funded 
by individual contributions.  Each individual who contributes to the clean up program would 
receive a certificate indicating that they helped the effort. 
 
I would contribute $X to a program that would result in an entire clean up of 500 acres of 
wetlands and a partial clean up of 50 acres: 
 
      Yes      No 
 
Question J:  
Thanks for participating! 
 
A special Maryland Day 2002 environmental conservation program has been  discussed at the 
University of Maryland. This program, if funded, would clean up wetlands in the Chesapeake 
Bay.  The clean up program would by funded by individual contributions.  Each individual who 
contributes $X to the clean up program would receive a certificate indicating that they helped the 
effort. 
 
Please choose your most preferred choice from below: 
 
A.  For a contribution of $X, an entire clean up of 500 acres of wetlands would     
     occur.  
B.  For a contribution of $X, an entire clean up of 500 acres and a partial clean up of 50 
acres would occur. 





2. F50 – closed-ended farmland preservation question 
 
Question L: 
Thanks for participating! 
 
A special Maryland Day 2002 environmental conservation program has been discussed at the 
University of Maryland. This program would permanently preserve 500 acres of Maryland 
farmland.  The farmland conservation program would be funded by contributions to conserve 
farmland in parcels 1/10 of an acre in size (1/10 of an acre is about the size of a basketball court). 
Each individual who purchases 1 unit (basketball court size) of farmland for the conservation 
program would receive a certificate indicating that they helped the conservation effort. 
 
If a farmland conservation package were offered to you at a price of $50 (to permanently preserve 
500 acres), would you purchase one? 
 
    Yes      No 
 
Question M: 
Thanks for participating! 
 
A special Maryland Day 2002 environmental conservation program has been discussed at the 
University of Maryland. This program would permanently preserve 500 acres of Maryland 
farmland and temporarily (5 years) preserve 50 acres.  The farmland conservation program would 
be funded by contributions to conserve farmland in parcels 1/10 of an acre in size (1/10 of an acre 
is about the size of a basketball court). Each individual who purchases 1 unit (basketball court 
size) of farmland for the conservation program would receive a certificate indicating that they 
helped the conservation effort. 
 
If a farmland conservation package were offered to you at a price of $50 (to permanently preserve 
500 acres) and temporarily (5 years) preserve 50 acres, would you purchase one? 
 
    Yes      No 
Question J: 
Thanks for participating! 
 
A special Maryland Day 2002 environmental conservation program has been discussed at the 
University of Maryland. This program would preserve farmland throughout Maryland. The 
farmland conservation program would be funded by contributions to conserve farmland in parcels 
1/10 of an acre in size (1/10 of an acre is about the size of a basketball court). Each individual 
who purchases 1 unit (basketball court size) of farmland for the conservation program would 
receive a certificate indicating that they helped the conservation effort. 
 
Please choose your most preferred choice from below: 
A.  I would purchase a farmland conservation package offered to me at a price of $50 if it 
would permanently preserve 500 acres of Maryland farmland. 
B.  I would purchase a farmland conservation package offered to me at a price of $50 if it 
would permanently preserve 500 acres and temporarily (5 years) preserve 50 acres of 
Maryland farmland. 
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Table 1 Experimental Design 
 
Panel A: Sportscard Market 
  Auction Bids  Choice 




Nondealers  LI & MI  JP  JC 
Dealers  LI & MI  JP  JC 
Notes: List (2002) conducted a parallel design with the cards graded for quality  
LI  = Less, Isolated: 10-card bundles valued in isolation 
MI = More, Isolated: 13-card bundles valued in isolation 
 JP  =  More & Less: 10 and 13-card bundles priced jointly 




Panel B: Public Goods Design 
Good & Price  Isolated Evaluation  Joint Evaluation 
Watershed $50 
W50 
LI & MI 
 




LI & MI 
 
L, M, & N 
 
Farmland preservation $50 
F50 
LI & MI 
 
L, M, & N 
 
Notes: Questions are dichotomous (yes/no) and ask about willingness-to-pay for the public good at the 
price indicated in column 1.   
Separate: LI = Less Separate, MI= More Separate  
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Table 3 Experimental Results – Sportscard Market 
  Bundle 
 
Treatment    10 cards      13 cards 
Nondealers      Auction Bids 
LI (n=33)    $4.05 (.45)      ---   
LI(n = 35)      4.86 (0.65)          
   
MI(n=30)    ---      $1.82 (.26) 
MI (n = 37)                3.06 (0.60) 
   
JP (n = 31)    $2.89 (.51)      $3.32 (.55) 
JP (n = 33)    3.72 (0.53)         4.52 (0.69) 
      Choices 
JC (n = 20)    1/20 (5%)      19/20 (95%) 
JC (n = 25)    2/25 (8%)      23/25 (92%) 
 
 
Dealers      Auction Bids 
LI (n = 30)     $3.52 (0.33)      --- 
LI (n = 35)      3.20 (0.44)          
 
MI (n = 30)    ---      $3.36 (0.65) 
MI (n = 35)              2.70 (0.41) 
 
JP (n = 30)    $3.21 (0.53)      $3.48 (0.53) 
JP (n = 28)     3.09 (0.47)       3.45 (0.50) 
 
      Choices 
JC (n = 15)         0/15 (0%)             15/15 (100%) 
JC (n = 13)        0/13 (0%)                       13/13 (100%) 
Notes:  Mean auction bids are reported. Numbers adjacent to bids in parentheses are standard errors 
(percentages for choice treatments). The results in bold are for the ungraded sportscard treatments. 
Underneath in italics, are the comparable results for the graded sportscards, reported originally in List 
(2002).  
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Table 4 Tobit Estimates of Auction Bids – Pooled Sportscard Market Treatments 
Dependent Variable                         
Bid        Parameters     Linear Combinations  
Graded     0.007  Result 1       0.548*** 
                  (0.539)                           (0.198) 
More         -3.246***  Result 2a   0.138 
    (0.598)     (0.657) 
Joint               -1.487***  Result 2b  0.293        
                      (0.515)                               (0.199) 
Dealer    -0.804                                                                 
    (0.671)   
Graded x More        1.707**      
    (0.771)   
Graded x Joint       1.500**    
    (0.693)   
Dealer x More         3.384***    
    (0.893)   
Dealer x Joint         0.692        
    (0.797)    
More x Joint          3.794***      
    (0.101)    
Graded x Dealer       -0.752                 
    (0.858)    
Dealer x More x Joint        -3.639***    
    (0.937)    
Graded x More x Joint    -1.334    
    (0.819)    
Graded x Dealer x More      -2.284** 
    (1.151) 
Graded x Dealer x Joint    -0.620 
    (1.090) 
Graded x Dealer x More x Joint   2.089* 
    (1.221) 
Constant          4.337***      
    (0.395)      
______________________________________________________________________ 
N    509
   
log likelihood
    -1069.80   
chi-square(15)    122.78   
Prob>chi-square    0.000   
Bids  on  graded  cards  are  from  List’s  (2002)  study.  Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses  underneath  the 
coefficients.  Statistical significance is indicated by:  *  p < .10, **  p < .05, ***  p< .01.  Result 1 tests 
More + More x Joint > 0. Result 2a tests More + More x Deal < 0. Result 2b tests More+ Dealer x 
More + More x Joint + Dealer x More x Joint  > 0. 
  
 
   34 
 
Table 5:  Proportion Contributing to Public Good  
   
Isolated Evaluation Mode 
 
Joint Evaluation Mode 









1 χ  
W50  .67 
n = 30 
.63 
n = 30 
  L=.30,M=.50,N=.20 





W100  .62 
n = 29 
.61 
n = 31 
L=.31 M=.45,N=.24 















F50  .58 
n = 36 
.51 
n = 39 
 
L=.17,M=.53,N=.30 




W & F 
Pooled 
.62 
n = 95 
.58 
n = 100 
L=.26,M =.49,N =.25 




Separate Evaluation Mode: Less and More columns present the portion contributing to the public goods in 
the separate evaluation modes. Although contributions to the inferior good are uniformly higher, these 
differences are not significant at conventional levels in any treatment. 
Joint Evaluation Mode: Column J displays proportions contributing to less (L), more (M) public goods or 
not contributing (N).  Column ML reports on the significance of one-sample tests of proportions for the L 





Table 6: Contribution Rates Across Isolated and Joint Evaluation Modes 




S vs. J 
χ
2 
WP  0.63 
n = 120 
0.79 
n = 59  
3.90 
p< .05 
F50  0.55 











Notes:  Entries are the proportions contributing to the public good pooling the L and M goods within 
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1 Carson, Flores and Mitchell (1999) emphasize the isolated evaluation aspect of contingent valuation, 
noting that “contingent valuation surveys are centered around the choice between having a good and not 
having it.  This format serves to focus the respondent’s attention on the distinguishing characteristics.” 
2 Our interest in evaluation mode effects is not meant to imply that insensitivity to scope is inevitable in CV 
studies.  Carson, Flores, and Meade (2001) review the evidence and find that the majority of published 
studies pass scope tests.  Our focus is to shed light on the mechanism underlying scope failure when it does 
occur.  
3Previous research has distinguished automated from deliberate choice heuristics. The automated heuristic 
with  regard  to  judgments  is  operative  “when  the  individual  assesses  a  specified  target  attribute  of  a 
judgment by substituting another property of that object – the heuristic attribute – which comes more 
readily to mind”  (Kahneman and Frederick 2002; see also Frederick 2002). Kahneman and Frederick 
(2002) review the representativeness heuristic, and Slovic et al. (2007) the affect heuristic.  
4 A summary of List’s (2002) results is in Table 3 of this paper.  
5 To remove the grades we had to crack the cards out of their protective containers.  Great care was taken 
not to damage any of the cards.  
6 Shogren et al. (2001) provide evidence on the effectiveness of the random nth price auction.  They note 
also that simply making n large would diminish incentives for truthful revelation for high-value bidders. 
7 If the additional low quality good was considered a bad we would expect the L good to be preferred in 
joint evaluations. This is not the case in either the public or private good treatments.  
8 The L good is always presented first in the joint evaluation questions for the public goods.  While 
variation in the order of the stimulus is preferred, any unmeasured order effects in the protocol are likely to 
work against our observing the MJ ￿LJ relationship associated with an evaluation mode effect.   
9 An open-ended WTP question was also developed for farmland preservation, however, the structure of the 
question differs from the others in this study and in the literature and the results are omitted. The questions 
in the remaining public goods treatments are structured to parallel existing investigations of evaluation 
mode reversals.  We believe that the results of this inquiry suggest the need for additional research with 
more detailed stated-preference protocols.     
10 The linear combinations of coefficients for the sportscard market hypothesis tests in Table 2 are derived 
as follows:  
Market Evaluation Mode Effect hypotheses for nondealers: 
MS ￿ LS ￿ Constant + More < Constant ￿ More < 0. 
MJ ￿ LJ ￿Constant + More +Joint +More x Joint > Constant + Joint ￿More+More x Joint > 0. 
Market Evaluation Mode Effect hypotheses dealers: 
MS ￿ LS￿Constant + Dealer + More + Dealer x More<Constant + Dealer ￿More + Dealer x More < 0. 
MJ ￿ LJ￿ Constant + Dealer + More + Joint + Dealer x More + More x Joint + Dealer x Joint + Dealer 
x More x Joint > Constant + Dealer + Joint + Dealer x Joint ￿ More+ Dealer x More + More x Joint + 
Dealer x More x Joint  > 0. 
Market Information hypothesis (nondealers): 
[LS – MS]U > [LS – MS]G ￿Constant – [Constant + More] > Constant +Grade – [Constant +Grade + 
More + Grade x More]￿ Grade x More > 0. 
11 Statistical tests cannot distinguish between the contribution rates to the W50 and W100 treatments. As a 
result, we also report the results of the pooled watershed treatments as WP. 